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Abstract When English some combines with a singular NP, the resulting phrases
reliably convey affective meanings not shared by variants with a(n) or plural NPs.
Prior research has traced these effects to semantic properties of some that entail
that the speaker cannot identify a unique referent for the phrase. In this paper, we
present attested examples that conflict with this generalization. In addition, we argue
that semantic accounts miss an important generalization: some is reliably affective
only if a is available as an alternative. These facts suggest a pragmatic source for
the relevant meanings. To capture them, we argue that a given context can make
different modes of identification for entities relevant and that singular some signals a
lack of engagement with these modes. We analyze the pragmatics of this signaling
using the ‘lexical uncertainty’ version of the Rational Speech Acts model and show
how it can be used to characterize the observed affective meanings.
Keywords: indefinites, English singular some, conceptual covers, Rational Speech Acts
1 Introduction
When English some combines with a singular NP, the resulting phrases often convey
meanings not shared by variants with a(n) or plural NPs:
(1) a. I met a friend.
b. I met some friends.
c. I met some friend.
Whereas (1a) and (1b) are affectively unmarked, (1c) is reliably (though not in-
variably) perceived as conveying negative affective meanings. Farkas (2002) and
Weir (2012) trace these effects to semantic properties of some that entail that the
speaker cannot identify a unique referent for the phrase. In essence, these accounts
say that choosing some over its competitors is a choice to convey this uncertainty
directly, which often leads to negative pragmatic inferences. Similar intuitions run
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through semantic accounts of marked indefinites in other languages (Alonso-Ovalle
& Menéndez-Benito 2003, 2010, 2011; Aloni & Port 2015; Martí 2015; Koev 2017;
Solt & Stevens 2018).
In this paper, we identify two challenges for semantic accounts of English singu-
lar some. First, we present attested examples in which speakers use singular some to
refer to entities that they themselves identify in the context (section 3). This argues
against encoding speaker non-identifiability in the semantics. In addition, examples
involving speaker-identifiable referents often remain affective, which suggests that
non-identifiability cannot be the only source of the underlying meanings. Second,
we argue that semantic accounts miss an important generalization: some conveys
affective meaning only if a is available as competitor (section 3.3). Specifically, the
meanings are absent when some combines with plurals and mass nouns, and they
also seem to be bleached from words like someone and something, which show a
different distribution from a person and a thing.
We argue that these challenges point to a pragmatic source for the relevant
meanings. Our analysis builds on the general claim, explored in detail by Aloni
(2000), that a given context can support many modes of identification for entities
– for example, the ostensive mode, the naming mode, and descriptive modes that
key into social roles and other aspects of identity. Our central claim is that a speaker
who chooses singular some over a will convey that they are not engaging with any
of the most relevant modes of identification. Aloni & Port (2015) reach a similar
conclusion for Italian un qualche and German irgendein. This is the primary, stable
pragmatic effect; more variable effects like negative affectivity are derivative of
this – for example, some (but not all) contexts support an inference from lack of
engagement with such modes to a lack of interest in them.
To make this account precise, we use (in section 4) the version of the Rational
Speech Acts (RSA) model developed by Bergen, Levy & Goodman (2016), in which
pragmatic reasoning leads synonymous forms that differ in markedness to take on
different usage patterns. Our focus is on what messages signal about modes of
identification. To bring these modes into the RSA model, we translate them into
questions under discussion following procedures in Aloni 2000 and Aloni & Port
2015. The upshot is that singular some generally signals that the speaker is engaging
only polar questions rather than more fine-grained questions tied to specific modes
of identification. This association is the primitive pragmatic effect from which more
variable and nuanced effects like negative affectivity emerge. Finally, in the RSA
analysis, the effects depend on the presence of a as an alternative; if it is blocked for
any reason, then some is predicted to lose its affectivity. This derives one of the core
facts motivating a pragmatic account.
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2 Some prior work
There is an extensive literature on the special meanings conveyed by indefinite forms
in different languages. In the interest of space, we do not try to survey that literature
here. Rather, we focus our discussion on the notion of speaker non-identifiability
and various perspectives on it. These perspectives ultimately lead us to the idea that
modes of identification, and context-dependent preferences around such modes, are
important for understanding English singular some.
Farkas 2002 is a foundational theory of marked indefinite forms, covering a
variety of languages, words, and morphosemantic contexts. For English singular
some NP, Farkas proposes a discourse-semantic requirement that its associated
discourse referent be unidentified in context: if a discourse referent xi is introduced
by some NP, then xi must be compatible with multiple entities throughout the
discourse. Examples like (2) are used to motivate this constraint:1
(2) Susan rented some movie for us yesterday.
a. It was really long.
b. #It was The Maltese Falcon. (Farkas 2002: 70)
In (2), some movie establishes a discourse referent xi that could presumably pick
out multiple actual movies. The continuation in (2a) is compatible with the non-
identifiability constraint as long as it too leaves open the precise nature of the movie
given the entities that the discourse participants take to be salient. In contrast,
(2b) directly names the underlying referent, thereby clashing with the contextual
restriction imposed by some movie.
Weir (2012) makes a related proposal. For Weir, singular some is similar to a
regular indefinite semantically, but with an additional semantic presupposition that
its first (domain) argument is true of more than one entity. This presupposition helps
derive the differentiation condition, which says that a speaker uses some “to signal
that she could not, if presented with the extension of NP, ‘pick out’ the witness of
the existential claim”. This characterization is motivated by examples like (3):
(3) You are lost. You know that the city you’re in has only two squares. You
keep coming across both squares. You can tell them apart because one has a
fountain and the other doesn’t. You end up in the fountainless square in the
city. Your friend phones you:
Friend: Where are you?
You: I’m in a/#some square in the city. (Weir 2012: 182)
1 Throughout this section, we cite examples from the literature with their published judgments. While
the examples might in fact be marked, section 3 provides attested examples with the same general
form, which challenges the notion that these judgments reflect general restrictions. Section 4.6 seeks
to reconcile these intuitions.
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For Weir, the some variant is marked because the speaker is in a context in which
they can pick out the referent of some square in the relevant sense (even though their
knowledge of that referent is partial and even falls short of what the context seems
to require).
Solt & Stevens (2018) offer a related analysis of English some, focusing on
combinations of some with numeral expressions. Building on Weir (2012), they
posit an anti-singleton constraint on some, and they too predict that some is felicitous
only if the NP is not identifiable for the speaker in context, again with important
pragmatic qualifications as to what identification really entails.
Analyses of marked indefinites in other languages often center around notions
of identifiability as well. The influential work of Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-
Benito (2003, 2011) on the Spanish indefinite algún directly inspired the anti-
singleton constraints of Weir (2012) and Solt & Stevens (2018). For these anti-
singleton accounts, the idea is that inferences of speaker non-identifiability emerge
as implicatures with respect to singleton-domain alternatives that the speaker could
have uttered, but didn’t. That is, listeners assume that a speaker using algún can’t
identify the referent of the NP, or else they would have chosen a different referring
expression that doesn’t have singleton domain restrictions.
However, examples like (4) (from Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito 2011)
show that we should be cautious when assuming that the usage patterns for these
indefinites will be consistent across languages:

















Look! Some professor is dancing on the table.
While English some is compatible with ostension, Spanish algún is not. Examples
like (4a) motivate Weir (2012) to develop more fine-grained ways of talking about
identification and non-identifiability conditions.
A clear theme from the aforementioned work is that ‘speaker identifiability’
is itself a complex notion. Depending on the nature of the context, we might say
that a referent is identifiable for a speaker in one context but not in another even if
that speaker’s knowledge is held constant. Aloni & Port (2015) place this kind of
variability at the heart of their analysis of the Italian indefinite un qualche and the
German indefinite irgendein. In essence, they argue that, when a speaker chooses
un qualche or irgendein, they signal that they cannot identify the referent by means
of the method of identification that is most relevant. For example, in a context
in which the speaker needs to know the name of the referent in question, using
one of these marked indefinites would signal that they lack this knowledge while
allowing that they can identify the referent by other modes. In contrast, if the context
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instead demands identification by a professional role, then these indefinites become
consistent with identification by name (but not professional role).
In the next section, we offer a range of attested examples that help us distinguish
among these ideas. To summarize briefly, the new examples seem to rule out very
strict characterizations of non-identifiability; we see cases where singular some is
used even where the speaker has command of all relevant notions of identifiability,
a point of contrast with the Spanish, Italian, and German forms just discussed.
Nonetheless, the examples strongly suggest that different modes of identification
are important. This fact ultimately pushes us (in section 4) to characterize the usage
conditions of some not in terms of what the speaker knows but rather in terms of
what they aim to signal about the context.
3 Some data
This section seeks to characterize the core usage patterns for singular some that
inform our analysis. We begin with a selection of attested examples, from the
Corpus of Contemporary American English (CoCA; Davies 2008) and Web searches,
that suggest a broader range of uses than previous literature has predicted. These
examples begin to motivate our core characterization of singular some as signaling
information about the speaker’s intended modes of identification. Following that, we
report on two more general distributional facts that help to motivate our analysis: a
basic study of the frequency of singular some and a discussion of how some-based
forms relate to (compete pragmatically with) other indefinites.
3.1 Some notable examples
Example (5) is a fairly typical instance of singular some, in which the speaker seems
to be indicating that they lack relevant information about the referent:
(5) Speaker A: Some lady called for you, she needs your help.
Speaker B: What lady?
Speaker A: I dunno.
There is certainly an intuition that it would seem inconsistent in some sense for
Speaker A to reply to “What lady?” with “Your sister”, for example. This is an
intuition that we would like to capture in our analysis. However, examples like the
following begin to suggest that it would be too strong to derive this inconsistency
from the semantics of some:
(6) I saw some statue in Italy, and the expression on the guy’s face blew me
away. Like, I could read and recognize an emotion because some one 400
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years ago felt how I do, and he made a stone the right shape so people could
look at it and know exactly how he felt.
This example closely resembles (3). However, it seems clear that the speaker has
access to a great deal of information about the referent of the singular some phrase.
They could probably identify it by sight, and we don’t sense any inconsistency if we
assume that they could also identify the statue by name, by its location on a map, etc.
Our own intuition about the example is that the speaker’s choice to use some statue
says more about what they take to be relevant than it does about their knowledge.
Example (7) is similar:
(7) Context: Rachel is checked into the motel and is standing next to the motel
when she says:
Rachel: To be honest, I came here to win someone back, and it didn’t happen.
So, my big grand gesture ends here, as I sleep alone in some roadside motel.
Here, the speaker might be able to name the motel, recite its address, etc., but some
signals that these facts are not central, which helps imbue the story with a certain
melancholy – the lost love makes the speaker’s location beside the point.
That said, we might allow that the above examples involve only partial speaker
identifiability. Examples like the following seem to show that some is consistent
with full identifiability as well:
(8) Lorelei: It’s embarrassing to ask my friend to turn around and get some kid
at the middle school.
Patricia: What do you mean, some kid? He’s your brother.
(9) Some guy I used to date texted me: “‘I miss spending time together”.
In these examples, it is very clear that the speaker can identify the referent in many
relevant ways – by name, by ostension, under numerous descriptions. We infer this
from context and world knowledge in these cases, but such information can also be
directly encoded in the phrases themselves, as we see in the following examples:
(10) The guitar player is some kid I know [. . . ] and he shreds the guitar with
reckless abandon and a creepy smile on his face. He looks like one of the
members of Amebix, which fits perfectly with this band.
(11) Speaker A: Who’s Tiffany Henderson?
Speaker B: Just some girl I used to date since I was like five. But that’s over
now. She blew me off.
Taken together, these examples indicate that speaker identifiability is not the central
issue. What does seem to run through the examples is that they convey rich informa-
tion about how relevant the speaker judges the identity of the referent to be. Which
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statue is not relevant in (6) because just about any Italian statue will do. The identity
of the hotel is beside the point in (7). In (8), Patricia seems taken aback by Lorelei’s
apparent lack of interest in the identity of the referent and so repeats “some kid”
deliberately as a way of inquiring about this.
We also find examples in which the speaker uses both a proper name and singular
some to refer to the same entity. In the following examples, the name is used first:
(12) In Julian Assange’s world we are the bad guys – not the Russians, not the
Iranians, not the North Koreans. I hope the president-elect will get his
information and trust the American patriots who work in the intelligence
community who swear an oath and allegiance to the constitution and not
some guy hiding from the law with a record of undercutting and undermining
American democracy.
(13) To borrow a phrase from Gloria Allred’s favorite politician, Maureen Stem-
berg didn’t build Staples. Tom Stemberg built Staples and is justly entitled
to the earnings from Staples. If Romney somehow reduced the windfall that
some woman got because her ex-husband founded Staples, I say good for
him.
These examples are noteworthy in that the indefinite comes second but seems to
corefer with the previously mentioned name. This is surprising given well-known
preferences for indefinites to establish new discourse referents (Karttunen 1976;
Kamp 1981; Heim 1982). However, if the two expressions involve non-trivial
changes in the mode of identification, then it is easier to see why a speaker might
opt for such a discourse structure (see also Heim 1998 on ‘guises’).
In (14) and (15), the indefinite is used before the name:
(14) He’s some creepy, rich overpaid football player, I mean come on [. . . ]
Michael Vick killed dogs, and he did [it] in a heartless and cruel way.
(15) What does it mean for Kanye, who once sparked a very different sort of
media moment by announcing on live television that “George Bush doesn’t
care about Black people” to appear in a photograph in a MAGA hat with
some guy – namely music industry executive Lyor Cohen (more about him
later) – flashing the OK gesture?
These examples might be the most challenging for accounts based on speaker non-
identifiability, since both the proper names and the rich context suggest a great deal
of speaker knowledge of these referents. If we instead adopt the view that singular
some can convey information about modes of identification, then the examples make
more intuitive sense: which modes are relevant can evolve as the discourse evolves,
so that the proper name might be suitable at one stage and the indefinite at another.
In (16) and (18), we see that singular some can participate in discourse anaphora:
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(16) While I was at the airport, some relative of mine pointed at some people in
the distance and whispered they were Syrians. I said ‘Syrians’ out loud a bit
louder than I should have and the relative looked around to see if someone
had overheard us. Yeah, the Syrians were kind of feared in Lebanon . . .
(17) And some relative of mine has an amazing green house and a flower arranging
place and she has a huge trash can there too [. . . ] so I kinda based it off hers.
(18) Fox News correspondent John Roberts, who was front and center at Wednes-
day’s press conference, joined The Factor with his takeaways from the bizarre
event. “Jim Acosta of CNN was shut down a number of times,” Roberts said,
“and it had become clear to me before the press conference that CNN would
be iced out because they had published the report...”
Bill O’Reilly: But you have to know – you have to know – they could have
said, listen, don’t worry about this. Because it comes from some guy we
know who is smear merchant, has no credibility.
In (16) and (17), the singular some phrases establish new discourse referents that sup-
port subsequent definites. Example (18) is more involved: the discourse anaphoric
link involves two speakers, and the indefinite appears to pick out a referent that is
already established. As we noted in connection with (12) and (13), this is an unusual
pattern for indefinites, but it would seem to make sense if the proper name and the
indefinite involve different modes of identification.
3.2 Some corpus frequencies
The account we develop in section 4 depends on the claim that singular some is more
marked than a. Our primary evidence for this comes from corpus frequencies. In
a study of CoCA, we find that, while some across all of its uses is quite common,
it is far less common than a when it modifies a singular NP. CoCA’s 2020 version
contains roughly 1 billion words. There are 11,253,319 tokens of a followed by
a singular noun phrase, and 433,109 tokens of some followed by a singular noun
phrase. This means that a + singular NP is nearly 26 times more frequent than some
+ singular NP. This is a highly conservative estimate; singular some is likely even
less frequent, as this number doesn’t exclude mass nouns (e.g., some bread).
3.3 Some alternatives
This brief section seeks to position singular some within the class of English in-
definite expressions. The goal is to begin to map out the conditions under which a




First, the indefinite article a(n) cannot take plural complements, so we can think
of some NP as being pragmatically unopposed where NP is plural. It is tempting to
cite bare plurals as alternatives, but Carlson (1977) argues extensively that this is
incorrect based on contrasts in form and meaning. Similarly, other plural indefinites
(e.g., few NP) carry different semantic denotations and don’t always compete for
the same syntactic slots as some. Plural some is also the more frequent context for
some, occurring more than twice as frequently in CoCA as singular some. Second,
someone and something are distributionally different from a one/person and a thing,
so we claim that the relevant competition is not in play there either.
These facts relate to the core observation that plural some doesn’t consistently
give rise to the special affective meanings that we see with singular some, as we
saw in (1), nor do forms like someone and something. If we were to propose a
different semantic denotation for some with singular complements, we would need
to carefully define which uses of some involved that meaning and ensure that no
others could be interpreted as having that meaning. This would probably lead us
to make distinctions that were motivated purely by the facts at hand. On the other
hand, if we adopt a pragmatic account that depends crucially on speakers choosing
some over alternatives, then we might be able to capture the distribution of these
meanings in a uniform way without doing anything special in the semantics. We
now turn to developing such a pragmatic account.
4 Probabilistic pragmatic account
The central generalization that emerges from the previous section is that singular
some indicates that the speaker is not engaging with the most relevant modes of
identification. The current section develops a formal account of this signaling.2 The
key ingredients are as follows. First, building on ideas from Aloni & Port (2015), we
take all referential expressions to convey pragmatic information about the speaker’s
intended modes of identification, and we operationalize this notion using conceptual
covers (Aloni 2000). Second, to make the connection between messages and modes
of identification precise, we translate modes into questions under discussion (QUDs),
again building on Aloni’s (2000) analyses. Third, we apply the ‘lexical uncertainty’
version of RSA developed by Bergen, Goodman & Levy (2012) and Bergen et al.
(2016),3 with special attention paid only to the cost function on messages to reflect
2 Our OFS project https://osf.io/3wqzc/ provides a complete implementation of this theory and includes
all of the example simulations reported here.
3 The model of Kao, Bergen & Goodman (2014) is a potentially appealing alternative. That model
defines a listener that reasons jointly about the world and the QUD. Kao et al. marginalize over
possible QUDs, but one can as easily marginalize over worlds to capture the sense in which messages
directly signal QUDs. We leave exploration of this alternative for future work.
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W Jthe guitaristK Jthe drummerK Jthe singerK JjesseK JsandyK JdaniK
w1 j (signed) s d j s d
w2 j s (signed) d j s d
w3 j s d (signed) j s d
w4 j s d j s d
w5 d (signed) j s j s d
w6 d j (signed) s j s d
w7 d j s (signed) j s d
w8 d j s j s d
w9 s (signed) d j j s d
w10 s d (signed) j j s d
w11 s d j (signed) j s d
w12 s d j j s d
Table 1 The intensional model for the simple scenario from section 4.1.
general and context-dependent aspects of markedness. The result of all this is that a
speaker choosing singular some over a will be taken to be avoiding complex modes
of identification in favor of simpler ones.
To try to make this analysis intuitive, we ground the discussion in a simple
scenario (section 4.1) and an associated semantic theory (section 4.2). This is the
foundation for our core message/QUD connection (section 4.3) and in turn for our
pragmatic theory (section 4.4).
4.1 Simple scenario
We imagine that the speaker went to a concert, got their album signed by a band
member, and returned home to say, “Some band member signed my album”. What
does this convey beyond what we would get from alternatives like “A band member
signed my album” or “X signed my album” for some band member’s name X?
To make the scenario concrete, imagine that the band has three members – Jesse,
Sandy, and Dani. Our intensional model can be depicted as in table 1. The domain
of entities is D = { j,d,s} and the set of worlds is W = {w1, . . . ,w12}. The columns
in table 1 correspond to individual concepts and the ‘(signed)’ annotations indicate
that that band member signed the speaker’s album in that world.
4.2 Semantics
This section builds up the semantic theory that we use for our pragmatic simulations.
The key features: we rely on conceptual covers to define who-type questions (Aloni
2000), and we specify that some and a are semantically identical.
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4.2.1 Individual concepts and conceptual covers
Names are rigid designators:
(19) JjesseK = λw j JdaniK = λw d JsandyK = λw s
In contrast, definite descriptions are non-rigid and follow the scenario. For ex-
ample, this is the meaning of the guitarist, corresponding to the column under
Jthe guitaristK in table 1:
(20) Jthe guitaristK = λw

j if w ∈ {w1,w2,w3,w4}
d if w ∈ {w5,w6,w7,w8}
s if w ∈ {w9,w10,w11,w12}
Following Aloni (2000), we capture the notion of a ‘mode of identification’ in
terms of conceptual covers, which are sets of individual concepts. A set of individual
concepts C is a conceptual cover for a domain D and set of worlds W iff
(21) ∀x ∈ D and ∀w ∈W, !∃c ∈ C : c(w) = x
Our scenario has exactly two covers:
(22) a. Jname coverK = {JjesseK,JsandyK,JdaniK}
b. Jrole coverK = {Jthe guitaristK,Jthe singerK,Jthe drummerK}
Compare these with {Jthe guitaristK,Jthe drummer]K}, which fails to be a cover
because, for example, d has no associated individual concept in w1. Similarly,
{Jthe singerK,Jthe drummer]K,JjesseK} isn’t a cover because j has two associated
individual concepts in w5.
4.2.2 Predicates
Predicates are functions from entities into sets of worlds. The semantics of signed is
as depicted in table 1. We also make use of a predicate musician that maps every
entity in the domain D to the full set of worlds W – that is, our domain consists
entirely of musicians.
For combining predicates with individual concepts, we can use this convenience
function (‘intensional function application’):
(23) JifaK = λ f λc
{




This allows us to have expressions like Jifa(signed)(jesse)K = {w1,w6,w11} even





Quantificational determiners are functions from pairs of predicates into sets of
worlds. Here of course we are making the foundational claim that some and a are
semantically identical:
(24) JaK = JsomeK = λ f λg
{
w ∈W : ∃x
(
w ∈ f (x)∩g(x)
)}
4.2.4 Interrogatives
We translate modes of identification to questions, which are derived from conceptual
covers. We adopt the general tenets of the partition semantics for questions (Groe-
nendijk & Stokhof 1984). In (25), we define polar interrogatives directly as mapping
sets into sets of sets:
(25) J?K = λ p {p,W − p}



















Our analysis of who questions is cover-sensitive in the sense of Aloni 2000. In
the interest of readability, we define this as a function that outputs pairs of worlds
that agree on the meaning of the predication defined by the conceptual cover and the
complement clause:
(28) JwhoK = λC λ f
〈w,w′〉 ∈W ×W :
{c ∈ C : w ∈ JifaK( f )(c)}
=
{c ∈ C : w′ ∈ JifaK( f )(c)}

It is then straightforward to map these sets of pairs of worlds into sets of sets, which
will be equivalence classes of worlds defined by f and C.
These meanings are cover-sensitive in that we get different questions depending
on which of the two covers we provide as the first argument. For example, if we
use name cover, then we get a question that corresponds to the set of propositions
determined by the name individual concepts (plus ‘no musician signed’).
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In contrast, if we use role cover, then we get the set of propositions corresponding
to the description given by the roles:












In what follows, we rely on the association that this creates between conceptual
covers and questions. For example, we can talk about engaging with the name-based
mode of identification or, equivalently, about the question in (29).
4.3 Questions as states
Normally in RSA analyses, the starting point is a lexicon that associates messages
with worlds/states according to the semantics. However, we primarily want to
characterize what messages signal about modes of identification. In casting these as
conceptual covers, we can use our denotation of who to get from covers to questions
as modes of identification. Once we have done this, the goal is to systematically
relate messages to questions. Our proposed method for doing this employs a simple
and familiar notion of answerhood:




Here ℘(W ) is the powerset of W . The definition just says that p answers q iff p is
equivalent to a union of some cells in q. This is essentially the notion of partial
answer from Groenendijk & Stokhof 1984 (and see Groenendijk 1999 for a closely
related set of pragmatic definitions).
Putting our semantics together with this ‘Question as states’ view, we derive
table 2 as the basis for RSA analyses in our scenario. Here, 1 means ‘answers’
and 0 means ‘doesn’t answer’, according to (31). To save space, we use J?jesseK
to abbreviate (26), J?aK to abbreviate (27), Jwho nameK to abbreviate (29), and so
forth for the others. Thus, the above specifies a set of states containing (i) all the
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Jwho nameK Jwho roleK J?aK J?jesseK J?sandyK J?daniK J?guitaristK J?singerK J?drummerK
some 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
a 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
jesse 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
sandy 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
dani 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
the guitarist 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
the singer 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
the drummer 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 2 The answerhood relation A from (31).
polar questions we can create based on individual concepts and quantifiers as well
as (ii) the two more fine-grained questions we can derive using the two conceptual
covers in our scenario. As we would expect given that some and a are semantically
identical, they also answer exactly the same questions.
4.4 Pragmatic model
Our pragmatic model is identical to the one developed by Bergen et al. (2016), which
has been used to analyze a wide range of pragmatic phenomena (Potts & Levy 2015;
Potts, Lassiter, Levy & Frank 2016; Champollion, Alsop & Grosu 2019; for a related
proposal, see Jäger 2012). Our only modification is that we apply the model to
message/question connections rather than message/state connections.
We can think of the model as having two layers. In the first layer, the nature
of the message/question connections is fixed to be a single such structure A, as in
table 2. Speaker and listener agents reason in terms of this fixed structure. In the
second phase, the speaker and listener agents reason about sets of these structures
all at once, which can be taken to represent their uncertainty about how exactly
messages relate to (engage with) QUDs. This more abstract form of reasoning is key
to capturing the effects of markedness where synonymous signals are involved.
With this in mind, let’s develop the first layer of the model. A context for this
model is a tuple (M,Q,A,P,Cost). Here M is a set of messages, Q is a set of possible
questions under discussion, A is a ‘lexicon’ as in table 2, capturing the answerhood
relation, P is a prior probability distribution over Q, and Cost is a cost function on
messages, with larger costs indicating more marked or costly messages.
The model begins with a literal listener l0:
(32)
l0(q | m,A) =
A(m,q) ·P(q)
∑q′∈Q A(m,q′) ·P(q′)
Given any message m ∈M, this agent defined a probability distribution over ques-
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tions, assigning positive probability only to questions q where A(m,q) = 1, and
taking the prior probability of questions into account.
The first pragmatic speaker reasons about this literal listener:
(33)
s1(m | q,A) =
exp(α (log l0(q | m,A)−Cost(m)))
∑m′∈M exp(α (log l0(q | m′,A)−Cost(m′)))
This looks very involved but unpacks into just a few key pieces. On observing a
state q, this agent defines a distribution over messages. It does this by considering
the values assigned by l0 while also taking the costs of those messages into account.
We take the log of the l0 values so that they are in a mathematical space in which it
makes sense to subtract real-valued costs. The parameter α controls the strength of
the inferences – larger α will increase the distances between the values calculated,
thereby amplifying any pragmatic contrasts that they contain. Finally, the entire
expression is exponentiated to take us from the log-valued space back into a space
of values that can be normalized into a probability distribution.
In standard versions of RSA (e.g., Frank & Goodman 2012; Goodman &
Stuhlmüller 2013), a pragmatic listener responds to this agent. This agent would have
the same form as (32), but it would reason in terms of s1 rather than the answerhood
relation A. This model can generate a wide range of patterns that we might place
under the heading of scalar implicature, but Bergen et al. (2016) show that it is not
able to capture standard effects related to the markedness of messages.
To address this, Bergen et al. introduce the idea that the lexicon A is not fixed, but
rather has some pragmatic uncertainty about it. For them, this uncertainty concerns
the lexicon – or, more generally, the semantic system. In our application of these
ideas, the uncertainty relates to the answerhood relationship.
To define this new model, we simply extend the above contexts into tuples
(M,Q,P,Cost,A,PA). The changes are that we don’t have a fixed A, but rather a set
of them A, as well as a prior over those objects PA. The recursion suggested by (32)
and (33) then continues with the following ‘uncertainty listener’:
(34)
L1(q | m) =
P(q)∑A s1(m | q,A)PA(A)
∑q′∈Q P(q′)∑A s1(m | q′,A)PA(A)
This agent reasons about all of the A in A. The precise nature of this set A is left
open by the model. Following Bergen et al., we take table 2 and allow every message
to be refined so that it is compatible with any subset of the states it is compatible with
in table 2. For example, since jesse is compatible with Jwho nameK and J?jesseK,
we allow lexicons where it is compatible with both of those as well as ones in which
it is compatible with just Jwho nameK and others where it is compatible with just
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Cost Jwho nameK Jwho roleK J?aK J?jesseK J?sandyK J?daniK J?guitaristK J?singerK J?drummerK
0.5 some 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
0 a 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 jesse 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 sandy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 dani 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 the guitarist 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
1 the singer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
1 the drummer 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
P 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Table 3 Primary simulation: L4 with a available as an alternative. The costs of
messages are given in the rightmost column, and the (flat) prior over
questions is given in the bottom row. Gray highlights the most probable
questions for each message.
Cost Jwho nameK Jwho roleK J?aK J?jesseK J?sandyK J?daniK J?guitaristK J?singerK J?drummerK
0.5 some 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 jesse 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 sandy 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 dani 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
1 the guitarist 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
1 the singer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
1 the drummer 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0
P 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
Table 4 As in table 3 but with no a alternative.
J?jesseK. The set A contains every combination of every lexical refinement. Given
these assumptions, we obtain 35,721 lexicons from table 2. We always assume PA
assigns the same value to all of them.
From here, the model proceeds essentially as in the base case, but without the
dependence on a particular A:
(35) Sn(m | q) ∝ exp(α (logLn−1(q | m)−Cost(m))) n > 2
(36) Ln(q | m) ∝ Sn(m | q)P(q) n > 2
To reduce clutter, we have left off the denominators here, specifying instead values
that are proportional to the final values. To obtain the normalized values, one uses
essentially the same denominator as in (33) for (35) and (32) for (36).
4.5 Simulations
Table 3 presents our primary simulation using the model just presented. For this
simulation, we set α = 4 and depict L4. These are aggressive pragmatic settings that
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are informed by results in Bergen et al. 2016 for capturing markedness implicatures.
In addition, we need to make two specific assumptions about the cost function Cost.
First, we specify that some is more costly than a, reflecting the core markedness
intuitions and the frequency imbalances discussed in section 3.2.
Second, to achieve the full range of desired effects, we must also specify that
the other, more specific referring expressions (Jesse, the guitarist, etc.) are more
costly than some. This is not necessarily motivated directly by our observations for
some. Rather, we claim it is marked in general to try to engage very specific modes
of identification using indefinites. For example, if the speaker wishes to engage
with the mode of identification by name, then using a name is clearly better. For
the scenarios we want to model, something must be preventing the speaker from
doing this. The reasons could relate directly to which modes of identification are
relevant. On the other hand, the reasons could be orthogonal to these considerations
– for example, a concern that one of the discourse participants doesn’t fully master
these more specific forms. To set these issues aside, we assign these forms higher
cost, with the result that a emerges as the best way of engaging these more specific
questions, as desired. If we don’t do this, then some and a both associate with J?aK.
In table 4, we simply remove a as an alternative and run exactly the simulation
from table 3. This too shows the desired result: some is now equally likely to engage
with the fine-grained ‘who’-type questions and the polar question J?aK. This is the
bleaching of the special meanings that we sought to predict in situations in which
some is not perceived as a deliberate choice over a.
4.6 Discussion
The simulations achieve our central goal: we predict that some is a disfavored way
of engaging with fine-grained modes of identification where a is available as an
alternative. We now address important questions that this simulation raises.
First, we think our account can explain why the examples from section 2 might
sound marked. We predict that the stable pragmatic effect of singular some is to
convey that the speaker is not engaging with fine-grained modes of identification.
In examples like (2b), the speaker transmits this signal and then, with no apparent
motivation, directly engages with a precise mode of identification (naming). This
switch is perhaps jarring enough that it comes across as truly infelicitous; see also the
discussion in Lauer 2013 of how uncancellable implicatures can arise in situations
where cancellation cannot be motivated. We can compare this with examples like
(12) and (13). These too use singular some and then subsequently name the entity.
However, the speaker motivation is much clearer for these cases, and it seems we
can even characterize it in terms of a desire to change the mode of identification.
Second, our account stops short of predicting negative affectivity directly. Our
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claim is that negative affectivity is a derivative pragmatic effect rather than a primary
one. What our analysis delivers is that a speaker using singular some is not engaging
with fine-grained modes of identification. There can be many underlying reasons for
this. Negative affectivity is likely to be strong where (i) contextual cues or world
knowledge give us confidence that the speaker can engage with fine-grained modes
of identification and (ii) those modes are relevant. In these contexts, if the speaker
chooses some, they are deliberately avoiding relevant, pragmatically accessible
information about a referent. This is where we get the surprised response from
Lorelei in (8), and it contributes to the overall negativity of cases like (12).
Third, as we noted above, the decision to make Jesse and the guitarist and the
others in that group more costly than some might seem unmotivated. Without this,
both a and some act like one might expect a regular indefinite to act: they become
associated pragmatically with J?aK. The names become preferred ways of engaging
with Jwho nameK and the definites are best for Jwho roleK. This seems natural
given the pragmatic dynamic established by our system. That said, it does feel like a
weakness of our account. One might hope that, conditional on hearing a, the listener
would be open to associating it with the more specific modes. The deep pragmatic
recursion we use to achieve our central results rules this out; if we instead look at L1
rather than L4, holding everything else about our main simulation the same, we do
see the desired pattern emerge, albeit weakly (e.g., L1(Jwho nameK | some) = 0.16).
Finally, it is worth asking what happens if one specific mode of identification
is more likely. Aloni & Port (2015) discuss situations in which fine-grained modes
of identification differ in their relevance. We can model these differences using the
prior term P. In particular, if we hold everything about the simulation in table 3
the same but allow P(Jwho nameK) to get very large, then the L4(Jwho nameK | a)
cell goes towards 1, which is the manner implicature pattern studied by Bergen
et al. (2016). This can be compared minimally with the corresponding values in
table 3, where the probability mass for a is equally distributed across Jwho nameK
and Jwho roleK.
5 Conclusion
We presented a range of new attested examples of English singular some and argued
that the common pragmatic effect running through them is that the speaker is
signaling a lack of engagement with relevant modes of identification. Depending on
the context, this might give rise to inferences that the speaker is ignorant about such
modes, or doesn’t regard them as relevant, which can result in negative affectivity.
We used the ‘lexical uncertainty’ RSA model of Bergen et al. (2016) to capture these
effects, which in effect assimilates them to manner implicatures, though with a focus
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